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ABSTRACT
Dodd–Frank, the financial reform law passed in the United States in
response to the 2008 financial crisis, established the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, a new federal regulator with the sole
responsibility of protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or
abusive practices. This decision marked the end of a highly
politicized reform debate in the US Congress, in which
proponents of the new bureau would normally have been
considered to be much weaker than its opponents. Paradoxically,
an emerging civil society coalition successfully lobbied decision-
makers and countered industry attempts to prevent industry
capture. What explains the fact that rather weak and peripheral
actors prevailed over more resourceful and dominant actors? The
goal of this study is to examine and challenge questions of
regulatory capture by concentrated industry interests in the
reform debates in response to the credit crisis which originated in
the US in 2007. The analysis suggests that for weak actors to
prevail in policy conflicts over established, resource-rich
opponents, they must undertake broad coalition building among
themselves and with influential elite allies outside and inside of







On 21 July 2010, US President Barack Obama signed into law the Dodd–FrankWall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act), which included major consu-
mer protection provisions that fundamentally changed the regulatory landscape for finan-
cial services. Under Title X of the Act, the reform law established the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB), a new federal regulator with the sole responsibility of protect-
ing consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices. The proposal calling for an
independent consumer regulator pitted two coalitions against each other. In early 2009,
an emerging coalition of relatively resource-poor civil society actors started to actively
support the policy. The US Public Interest Research Group (US PIRG), together with
other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the largest labour groups, established
a new coalition of about 250 labour, civil rights, and small business organizations, which
formally went public in May 2009 as Americans for Financial Reform (AFR). They were
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opposed by a much more powerful financial lobby. From the beginning, business groups—
mainly the American Bankers’Association (ABA), the US Chamber of Commerce, and the
Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA)—‘closed ranks’ against the proposed bureau
(Johnson & Kwak, 2011, p. 198). In terms of material resources, the pro-reform coalition
was clearly outmatched by the opposing financial industry lobby. The US Chamber started
an advertising campaign of at least US$2 million aimed at defeating the new bureau.
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the financial industry spent US$224.6
million on lobbying in 2009, more than any other sector except the health sector
(Renick Mayer, 2009). Funding for pro-reform groups became available from progressive
foundations, with AFR raising about US$1.4 million in the first year, only a fraction of the
financial industry’s lobbying budget.1
Against all odds, the civil society coalition, formed among actors usually classified as
weak, managed to win a major victory when the President signed Dodd–Frank into law
—including a powerful new regulator for consumer financial products. In the final bill,
the pro-reform advocates had met their major policy aims: In accordance with activists’
wishes, the new bureau had market-wide coverage, and a single director; its funds were
not subject to the congressional appropriations process; and it had significant authority
on rules, supervision, and enforcement over banks and non-banks. Despite the fact that
massive industry lobbying had successfully slowed down the implementation of US
financial regulatory reform—with 60% of Dodd–Frank’s rules not yet in place by 1 July
20132—the creation and implementation of the CFPB (despite the attempt of the Repub-
lican Party to block the appointment of an executive director until July 2013) was a unique
win for consumer advocates. As one consumer activist commented: ‘Compared to a world
where we could not make a single advance on consumer regulation for decades, this is a big
change.’3
The outcome is puzzling, as we would normally expect more resourceful groups to have
more political influence. In particular, the US banking industry is one of the most resour-
ceful, powerful, and politically savvy actors in Washington, DC, winning many of their
political battles. The CFPB is therefore a case in point to study the power of weak interests
in financial regulation. Some critics might object that the new regulator for consumer pro-
ducts was merely a fig leaf covering the influence of concentrated interests in the financial
overhaul. One reason to think that this was not the case is the amount of resources the
industry invested to defeat the new bureau. The Bankers Association’s public outcry
against the agency and the appearance of its president to testify in early 2009 before a Con-
gressional Committee made clear that preventing the enactment of a consumer bureau was
of high legislative priority to the industry. Leading banking lobbyists confirmed that the
defeat of the consumer bureau proposal was among the industry’s top advocacy goals.4
Why was the US banking industry not able to beat out consumer groups in the case at
hand?
Analysing financial reforms in response to the crisis, international political economy
(IPE) scholars so far have focused on explaining the incrementality of reform outcomes
(Admati & Hellwig, 2013; Buckley & Howarth, 2010; Johnson & Kwak, 2011; Moschella
& Tsingou, 2013), thereby neglecting the empirical universe of cases of regulatory
reforms that brought about sea changes in spite of industry opposition. In this article, I
look beyond the impact of material resources in influencing policy decisions. In offering
a close empirical analysis of a causal mechanism5 at work that allows relatively poorly
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resourced, diffuse interest groups6 to leave their imprint on financial reforms, the account
here will deal with a side that is less well known to researchers. The study responds to
recent calls for greater attention to ‘the mobilization of nonfinancial industry groups in
shaping financial regulatory policies and the impact that this has over the capacity of
financial industry groups to shape regulatory policies’ (Pagliari & Young, 2013, p. 142).
It thereby adds a crucial dimension—namely, the role of citizen groups—to the burgeon-
ing literature on financial regulation.
Analysing consumer credit market reforms is particularly interesting because abusive
consumer lending practices allegedly contributed to the financial meltdown that started
in 2007. So far, only a few studies on Dodd–Frank have acknowledged that traditional
capture dynamics surrounding financial regulatory policy-making were significantly
altered by the shock of the credit crises (Clapp & Helleiner, 2012; Kastner, 2014; Pagliari
& Young, 2012; Quaglia, 2010; Woll, 2013; Woolley & Ziegler, 2011; Young, 2013).
Although these studies hint at the importance of increased actor plurality, brought
about in particular by newly mobilizing civil actors, the causal dynamics of how groups
outside of finance become successful change agents as a countervailing force to financial
industry interests remain largely unexplored. The present analysis fills this gap. While this
article builds on prior work, it goes beyond it in carefully specifying the causal mechanism
that can explain regulatory change representing organized diffuse interests. This article
also joins recent efforts in political economy and economic sociology to explain how
business power can be curbed by public salience (Culpepper, 2011; Pagliari, 2013),
legitimacy coalitions (Trumbull, 2012), or moral boundaries (Orban, 2016).
The empirical analysis is based on some 40 interviews with representatives from
civil society and industry as well as policy-makers and regulators in Washington, DC
between September 2013 and March 2014. For the legislative proposals investigated
here, I conducted interviews with senior-level experts, ranging from Congressional
staffers and government officials to relevant interest groups that had particular responsi-
bilities for the proposed legislation as well as detailed knowledge of the negotiations. The
analysis suggests that in order for weak actors to prevail over established, resource-rich
opponents in policy conflicts, they must undertake broad coalition building among them-
selves and with influential elite allies outside and inside of Congress who share the same
policy goals.
The article begins by briefly outlining the degree of policy change. It will then present
four testable propositions derived from the literature to explain policy change representing
organized diffuse interests in financial regulation. In order to interpret the policy process,
the next section will use process tracing to apply theoretically derived hypotheses to the
empirical record of the case study. The conclusion will reflect on the implications for
our understanding of interest group politics.
Policy change: a new regulator
The system of consumer finance protection on the eve of the crisis was marked by regu-
latory gaps, allowing for ruthless lending practices which contributed to increased defaults
and eventually to the meltdown of the US housing market. In order to address the regu-
latory failure of the past, the Dodd–Frank Act centralized consumer protection regulations
at one single agency, which operates independently, is well funded, and is under the
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leadership of a single director. The Bureau was established in Title X of the reform law as
an independent regulatory agency within the Federal Reserve System (Fed) with the sole
responsibility of protecting consumers of financial products. The CFPB’s mission is to
ensure ‘that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and ser-
vices [that] are fair, transparent, and competitive.’7 In charging one single agency with
consumer protection responsibilities, the reform succeeded in replacing a patchwork of
seven different agencies, thereby consolidating and strengthening the regulation of consu-
mer financial products. In addition, it consolidates consumer protection legislation pre-
viously found in a number of different statutes (such as the Truth in Lending Act and
the CARD Act of 2009). While the CFPB is administratively located within the Fed, the
Board of Governors cannot interfere in its operations.
Table 1 summarizes the main features of the CFPB as signed into law in July 2010,
showing which proposals coming from AFR made it into the regulation. The Dodd–
Frank Act delegated three types of authority to the CFPB: Rule-making, supervision,
and enforcement of federal consumer financial protection laws. The Bureau has the auth-
ority to oversee very large banks, thrifts, and credit unions with assets over $10 billion, as
well as non-bank businesses (companies that can offer consumer financial products or ser-
vices without having a bank, thrift, or credit union charter). The CFPB was the first federal
regulator that not only has the ability to write rules for non-banks, but it also has the ability
to supervise and examine non-banks—‘a power that has never accrued to any federal
bureau before.’8 This makes the CFPB a much more powerful regulator for consumer
financial services than the Federal Trade Commission was (Pridgen, 2013). More impor-
tantly, the agency has independent funding, specified as a percentage of the Fed’s budget,
and is not subject to the appropriations process, an important aspect for consumer
advocates. Another important provision is that the Dodd–Frank Act functions as a
federal ‘floor’ (not a ceiling) which allows states to raise the level of consumer protection,
one of the key demands of consumer advocates. Title X expands state authority by
allowing states to adopt stricter consumer protection laws on top of the federal regulations.
Table 1. Main Features of the CFPB under the Dodd–Frank Act as signed into law in 2010.
Regulatory Policy Reform measures in line with consumer groups’ demands
Structure/Head Agency established within the Federal Reserve System; single director
appointed by the President for 5-year term
Funding Transfer of 10–12% of the Federal Reserve System’s budget
Coverage/Authority Broad powers over any person, other than those explicitly carved out from
the Bureau’s authority, engaged in the provision of a consumer financial
product or service
Examination & enforcement power over
smaller financial institutions
Smaller financial institutions (with assets of $10 billion or less) will continue
to be subject to the examination and enforcement authority of their
current regulators
Relationship to state law (federal
preemption)
Would only preempt state laws to the extent of their inconsistency; state
laws providing greater consumer protection are not to be considered
inconsistent with federal law
Compromises/losses for consumer groups
Oversight by the Financial Stability Oversight
Council
Financial Stability Oversight Council with ability to set aside CFPB
regulations if the regulation ‘would put the safety and soundness of the
banking system or the stability of the financial system at risk’
Notable carve-outs Carve-out for small businesses
Authority over consumer laws Community Reinvestment Act exempt from CFPB authority
Source: Assembled by the author.
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Consumer lawyers, industry groups, and consumer associations have widely acknowl-
edged the CFPB as a powerful new regulator beyond mere gesture politics (Caggiano,
Dozier, Hackett, & Axelson, 2011; Johnson & Kwak, 2011; Pridgen, 2013).
Existing explanations for post-crisis financial reforms
Capture theories
My main rival hypothesis in this article is an account—based on capture theories—which
claims that the outcome of financial reforms can only be explained with reference to
industry preferences and their translation into policy. Regulatory capture, the most
accepted theory of regulatory change in the aftermath of the financial crisis, is important
but somewhat incomplete.9 It offers a compelling explanation, based on the power of
financial industry lobbies, of why reforms enacted in response to the crisis were rather
incremental in nature. However, it does not account for the empirical universe of cases
of regulatory reforms that brought about sea changes in spite of industry opposition.
Further, as several critiques of capture theories have pointed out, industry capture is
often merely assumed, rather than empirically tested (Carpenter & Moss, 2014; Young,
2013). Most scholarly works evaluating specific aspects of post-crisis financial regulation
have linked modest reform efforts despite the magnitude of the crisis to continued private
sector influence. Tsingou (2010), for instance, testifies to the persistence of the influence of
a transnational policy network of financial experts. Emphasizing ‘close financial, personal
and ideological ties’ between policy-makers and the banking industry, Johnson and Kwak
(2011, p. 12) have argued that Wall Street returned to ‘business as usual’ after the crisis,
with its political influence in Washington as powerful as ever. Admati and Hellwig
(2013, p. 3) have argued along the same lines that ‘despite the enormous damage of the
financial crisis of 2007–2009, the effort to reform the financial system has been stymied.’
Given the actor constellation involved in the financial reform debate, capture theories
would predict clear outcomes. In the case of the US consumer protection agency, where
all ‘strong’ actors representing the financial services industry opposed a new regulator
and only ‘weak’ actors, including consumer associations, labour groups, and other public
interest groups, supported the provision, we would expect an easy defeat of the reform pro-
posal. However, despite massive protest and considerable investment of lobbying resources
by business groups, the new consumer regulator became law and there were only minor
modifications to the original proposal. A theoretical position that claims massive and
ongoing impact of business power appears difficult to reconcile with this empirical evidence.
Restraining capture: plurality and salience
More recently, studies on financial regulation in response to the crisis have found evidence
that counters traditional capture analyses. A small but growing number of studies indicate
that the crisis was a catalyst in changing interest group dynamics in regard to financial
regulation. Highlighting the role of public salience, scholars increasingly emphasize popu-
list pressures on policy-makers as a driving factor for more stringent regulation of the
financial sector despite industry opposition (Baker, 2010; Pagliari, 2013; Woll, 2013).
Recent research has also shown that the crisis considerably weakened the industry’s
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capacity to veto or block reform proposals, due to political pressures (Steinlin &
Trampusch, 2012) as well as altered social relations within the financial policy network
(Young, 2013, 2014).
Increased actor plurality, closely linked to and motivated by heightened issue salience,
is a second factor that can account for decreasing industry influence. Quantitative analyses
show that the mobilization of interest groups beyond financial groups in the regulatory
debate following the crisis increased in the US, with more end users of financial services,
NGOs, and consumer organizations participating in the policy process (Pagliari & Young,
2012, 2014). Increased actor plurality could have two different effects on financial reform
debates: It might either allow industry groups to form coalitions with supportive non-
industry groups to leverage their influence (Pagliari & Young, 2014, p. 6) or it might
have the opposite effect and reduce industry impact on regulatory politics when outsider
groups successfully oppose industry preferences as a ‘countervailing force’ (Clapp &
Helleiner, 2012).
Recent insights from political economy suggest that the mobilization of outsider groups
as a ‘countervailing force’ had significant effects on the regulatory design of reforms. Scho-
lars analysing the US Dodd–Frank Act have found that a new network of small advocacy
groups successfully opposed industry lobby campaigns against stricter regulations, notably
in the area of derivatives regulation (Clapp & Helleiner, 2012; Orban, 2016; Woolley &
Ziegler, 2011) and consumer protection (Kastner, 2014; Kirsch & Mayer, 2013; Woolley
& Ziegler, 2011). Kastner (2014, p. 1), for example, argues that ‘a polymorphous
network of civil society organizations was able to gain momentum after the ﬁnancial
crisis and to inﬂuence the ﬁnancial reform process.’ Woolley and Ziegler (2016) show
how a new network of advocacy organizations, the so-called stability alliance, led by
AFR, was able to prevent capture of the rule-making process by the industry-supported
‘self-regulation’ alliance by promoting a particular ‘knowledge regime’. Although Kirsch
and Mayer (2013) offer a detailed journalistic account of mobilizing efforts on the part
of civil society coalitions in favour of a new consumer agency, the idea of how the
power balance shifted is largely absent.
Although new research evaluating industry influence on post-crisis regulatory reforms
in more detail is indeed more sophisticated than the narrative of pure capture that pre-
ceded it, the precise role of newly mobilized interest groups beyond the traditional finan-
cial groups remains theoretically implicit or at best underdeveloped. Given this weakness
of the existing analyses, the contribution of the study at hand is to specify a clearly circum-
scribed causal mechanism that can account for the increased policy influence of newly
mobilized nonfinancial groups in financial reforms.
A mechanism of post-crisis regulatory reform dynamics
Financial regulation constitutes a hard case for demonstrating the role of diffuse interests
groups in public policy. The case is based on a ‘least-likely’ design (Gerring, 2007; Levy,
2008). Although diffuse consumer interests have ‘systematically dominated national
policy processes’ (Trumbull, 2012, p. 10) in various policy areas in the post-Second
World War period and are more likely to succeed under conditions of high salience (Cul-
pepper, 2011; Woll, 2013), the effect of civic non-state actors is expected to be low in a
highly technical policy field such as financial regulation, which is dominated by savvy
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and resourceful financial industry groups. In the case at hand, diffuse interest groups were
pitched against intense industry opposition. Hence, I am assuming that salience effects will
not trump phenomena (such as technicality and industry opposition) that make advocacy
success of consumer groups ‘least likely.’ For the causal argument, salience is considered to
be a scope condition. The aim here is to show the policy influence of weak interests under
difficult conditions, ‘since if we are able to find the mechanism in a non-favorable setting,
this significantly increases our confidence in the existence of the causal mechanism in a
wider population of cases’ (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 152).
I suggest that research on social movements and regulatory politics provides tools to
complement existing approaches to explaining post-crisis financial reforms by identifying
additional mechanisms that help delineate unexpected reform trajectories. Following the
logic of theory-testing process-tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Trampusch & Palier,
2016), I outline a plausible causal mechanism to explain financial reform trajectories
after the crisis by linking diffuse interests to policy change in consumer credit markets
thereby opening the black box of preference attainment. The crisis clearly altered the con-
textual conditions for regulatory reforms, temporarily redistributing power away from
concentrated industry interests to more diffuse consumer interests. This de-legitimization
of the financial industry after the financial crisis momentarily neutralized the financial
sector’s organizational advantage and led to increasing frictions with policy-makers,
thereby changing interest group dynamics. Various scholars have argued that the financial
crisis had thrown the existing neo-liberal order and financial community into a ‘legitimacy
crisis’ (Helleiner, 2010; Morgan, 2010). Applying the theory of quiet politics to post-crisis
politics, Culpepper (2011, p. 197) predicts ‘a weakened bargaining position’ for organized
interests in a ‘radically changed political environment’ which was ‘under intense public
scrutiny.’
Following Mattli and Woods (2009), I suggest to integrate demand and supply side
factors into one causal mechanism in order to systematically explain financial regulatory
change counter to industry preferences and explore the institutional conditions under
which diffuse interests can become change agents in times of crises. Focusing on the ques-
tion of how diffuse interests were able to have their preference met in financial reforms, a
necessary supply side factor such as the more open institutional context in times of crisis
needs to be combined with the organization of societal groups as a coordinated coalition.
This, in turn, provides sufficient resources and allows pro-reform coalitions to channel
widespread public support and to align themselves with well-positioned elite allies sup-
porting the same policy goal. Drawing on existing explanations, I introduce four necessary
conditions as suggested by the literature that can explain why diffuse interests see their
preferences translated into public policy.
First, the financial crisis provides the contextual conditions for a policy window that
opened up for diffuse interest groups in terms of access and responsiveness and spurred
the formation of collective action in the post-crisis regulatory environment (Princen &
Kerremans, 2008, p. 1131). Qualitative changes in the post-crisis institutional context in
which financial regulatory policies were developed, combined with increased political
receptivity, allowed for increased access on the part of diffuse interest groups (Pagliari
& Young, 2013).
Second, focusing on agency of diffuse interest groups, more open political opportunity
structures in the context of the financial crisis provided new prospects for collective action
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of newly mobilizing interest groups. Kingdon (2010) suggests that a ‘window of opportu-
nity’ exists in the perception of participants who have to perceive its presence to take
advantage of it. From this view, collective action organizes in response to (perceived) pol-
itical opportunities. The organization as a coalition has another important effect: It can
provide sufficient resources to pro-reform groups to channel widespread public support
and serve as a link between public opinion and decision-makers (Kollman, 1998). Dür
and Mateo (2014, p. 1205) find that ‘groups supported by public opinion are more
likely to see their preferences reflected in public policy than other groups.’ Hence, the
crisis-induced organization as an advocacy coalition spurred by the perception of a
window of opportunity allows diffuse interest groups to effectively promote reform
goals. Notably, pro-reform groups can serve as transmitters of public opinion and
exploit the weakness of the opposition.
Third, experts that serve as policy entrepreneurs are one category often evoked as
important advocates for diffuse interests. In the words of Mattli and Woods (2009, p. 28):
the entrepreneur involves himself or herself to the best of his or her abilities in the process of
change, offering counsel, logistics, financial and technical expertise, or otherwise empowering
poorly resourced societal groups adversely affected by the regulatory status quo.
Drawing on the Schumpeterian notion of political entrepreneurs, Beckert (1999, p. 789)
considers the strategic agency of an entrepreneur ‘as the innovator who leaves behind rou-
tines’ as a necessary condition for institutional change. Well-positioned entrepreneurs can
exploit the same perceived political opportunities and leverage diffuse groups’ policy inﬂu-
ence by serving as sources of innovation and expertise.
Finally, politicians mainly promote diffuse interests when they expect electoral benefits.
Highlighting the role of elected officials under public scrutiny, Trumbull (2012) argued
that diffuse interests have a clear advantage in their ability to seemingly legitimize
policy decisions, whereas concentrated interests are viewed with suspicion. Mahoney
and Baumgartner (2015) hypothesized that government officials start to actively
promote a policy solution as partners in advocacy with outside groups after or as a reaction
to the intense mobilization of interest groups and an assessment of overall political recep-
tivity. From this perspective, it is likely that intense pro-reform mobilization leads to a
bandwagon effect that strengthens the reform side of the debate and encourages public
officials to actively side with the pro-reform groups in insider–outsider coalitions.
To sum up, the theoretical conceptualization here proposes the following causal
logic: While more open institutional access and political receptivity of government officials
encouraged initial group activities, it is only the extensive mobilization of groups
(in combination with the support of other prominent entrepreneurs under conditions
of salience) that made officials into active government allies advocating for diffuse inter-
ests. While diffuse interest groups can take advantage of political opportunities created by
political elites, the reverse is also possible: Collective action of lobbying groups can create
incentives for elites to pursue their own policy goals. Hence, the mobilization of counter-
vailing interest groups is considered one necessary element in a larger causal chain to
explain policy change in response to the financial crisis. The full mechanism explaining
the role of diffuse interests in post-crisis regulatory reform debates is illustrated in
Figure 1.
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The post-crisis financial regulatory environment in the US
Regulatory reform in the US emerged in a post-crisis environment which saw the legiti-
macy of the financial industry and its practices being strongly contested in the public
sphere. The heightened media attention raised by the crisis increased the perception of
undue industry influence. Previous regulatory deficits became the subject of public
outrage, pushing financial regulatory reform into the arena of ‘noisy politics,’ to use Cul-
pepper’s terminology. As mentioned above, heightened salience is an important dynamic,
since it can be a strong motivator for elected officials to act against the narrow interests of
an industry. By assessing the amount of news coverage, research showed that financial
regulation in general (Young, 2013, p. 3) and the consumer bureau in particular
(Kastner, 2014, p. 3) became highly salient with the American public during the early
reform period, between mid-2008 and mid-2009.
Increased salience in the regulatory reform context was accompanied by qualitative
shifts in policy-making that displayed increasing divisions among policy-makers and
the private sector. In light of the devastating consequences of the financial crisis,
policy-makers started to call industry groups’ expertise into question, as Representative
Brad Miller remarked in a statement in March 2009: ‘The political climate has changed.
The foreclosure crisis has wreaked havoc on middle-class families and our economy as
a whole. The industry’s arguments […] are not at all convincing’ (Harth, 2009). The finan-
cial sector was made the culprit of the crisis. In his Wall Street speech in April 2010, Pre-
sident Obama made clear that he regarded consumer protection as an essential element of
the financial reform, thereby risking ‘increasingly fractious relations’ with the financial
industry (Cooper, 2010).
Several examples from my interviews illustrate that the regulatory dialogue among
industry groups and government officials had suffered considerable cracks. One indicator
of such a crack is that financial groups learned about legislative proposals and intended
Figure 1. A causal mechanism: How diffuse interests can influence financial regulatory politics.
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policy changes much later than in the past and were thus largely excluded from the
agenda-setting phase of the decision-making process. About the Treasury Department’s
White Paper outlining its legislative proposal, one industry representative remembered
talking to Treasury officials but having ‘very little impact on the administration’s thinking
on the consumer side of the law.’ He also described how the regulatory dialogue had
noticeably changed after the crisis, saying that regarding the policy proposal to establish
a new consumer watchdog, industry associations ‘had almost no contact with the admin-
istration,’ which he characterized as ‘extremely unusual.’ Finally, when the White Paper
was issued in June 2009 (Department of Treasury, 2009), including a detailed provision
on the creation of a consumer agency, industry groups were ‘aghast about what was in
it.’10 Another interviewee from the industry side remembered lobbying on regulatory
reform to have been ‘very frustrating’ and ‘difficult.’ He recalled:
We were able to have a little bit of consultation with [Representative and co-sponsor of the
legislation] Barney Frank, while the House was putting together its bill, but not a lot and very
little with [Senator and co-sponsor] Chris Dodd, I am not sure we had any.11
These changes in interest group dynamics, as suggested here by anecdotal evidence from
interviewees, are signiﬁcant because they indicate that ﬁnancial lobby groups had partly
lost their political leverage. How did this crisis context, which derailed traditional mech-
anisms of capture, affect the political opportunity structure for diffuse interest groups?
Political opportunities: access and receptivity
Under public pressure, US policy-makers’ reluctance to engage with the financial industry
in the aftermath of the crisis was accompanied by increased receptivity to pro-reform
demands from diffuse interest groups. First and foremost, Congress and its committees
opened new access points for a broader range of interest groups. Starting in early 2009,
individual consumer representatives were repeatedly invited to testify before Congres-
sional committees.
Increased access was accompanied by increased receptiveness of policy-makers to
demands coming from these newly mobilized actors. Consumer advocates had very
limited capacity to push their advocacy goals during the housing boom that pre-dated
the crisis, precisely because policy-makers were not inclined to listen to their demands.
The political environment changed dramatically in the second half of 2008, when
public anger arose over the industry being bailed out at taxpayers’ expense. As public
pressure grew, US authorities quickly acknowledged the need for stronger consumer pro-
tection. In March 2009, Sheila Bair, Chair of the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corpor-
ation, noted: ‘There can no longer be any doubt about the link between protecting
consumers from abusive products and practices and the safety and soundness of the finan-
cial system.’12 Members of Congress also increasingly responded to demands coming from
consumer groups to restrict subprime lending and increase consumer protection.
The changing political climate was clearly felt by consumer advocates. As one intervie-
wee reported:
People had been trying for a long time to bring reforms about […] with no success […]. Now
in the aftermath of the boom there was […] a much more receptive environment that we
have to act on the lessons we have learned through this crisis.
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Polling data released by the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) in September 2009
give us clues about why the topic was very popular with decision-makers in general, with
57% of those polled supporting the idea of creating a new federal agency to protect con-
sumers (Limbach, 2009). Public opinion likely had an impact on policy choices; as Palletta
(2010) put it: ‘the CFPA [Consumer Financial Protection Agency, as it was named before
the law passed] became a symbol of the legislation, and many Democrats saw it as a way to
sell the ﬁnancial regulatory overhaul to voters.’
Clearly, the crisis had temporarily redistributed political leverage from financial inter-
ests to consumer advocates. Advocates realized that in order to win real reforms they had
to take advantage of the public anger about costly bank bailouts and the political oppor-
tunities that presented themselves for regulatory change.13
Mobilization of diffuse interests
Another development that bolstered the influence of diffuse interest groups was their
ability to forge coalitions among themselves, overcoming internal impediments to collec-
tive action. Indeed, the crisis turned out to be a ‘major catalyst’ for the formation of a new
alliance of civil society organizations including some 250 consumer associations, trade
unions, NGOs, and grass-roots groups rallying around the notion of a consumer regulator
(Kastner, 2014). Although civil society groups were not uncoordinated before (well-estab-
lished connections existed between various groups, often coordinated by the Center for
Responsible Lending, or CRL), in May 2009 relations were formalized under the umbrella
of ‘Americans for Financial Reform,’ which enabled consumer advocates to present a
united front.
Pro-reform groups were keenly aware of a policy window in the first years of the
Obama administration, when the Democratic Party had a majority in Congress. After
the midterm congressional elections of 2010, the cushion in Congress might be smaller.
In the words of one consumer representative: ‘The politics was right.’14 After the 2008
election, the Democratic Party enjoyed comfortable majorities in the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate to pass reform legislation. Indeed, during the final passage of the
Dodd–Frank Act, the 60 votes in the Senate enabled the Democrats to pass the bill with
all but three Republicans in opposition.
Further evidence that sustained collective action among diffuse interest groups was only
possible due to the financial crisis is provided by the fact that earlier attempts to forge
coalitions did not succeed. Shortly before the crisis, in 2007, earlier efforts of coalition
building among advocacy groups with similar policy goals under the umbrella of a non-
profit organization named Americans for Fairness in Lending (AFFIL) had failed. With
AFFIL’s funds largely depleted after three and a half years, and the coalition slowly
falling apart, the groups including CRL, Consumer Action, CFA, Consumers Union
(CU), National Consumer Law Center (NCLC), and US PIRG joined the new AFR
coalition.
Newly mobilized groups were key actors in channelling public opinion. One of the
coalition’s first steps had been to provide support for local grass-roots groups to enable
them to engage with their members of Congress.15 AFR was also very active in lobbying
Congress and top governmental officials throughout the long process that led up to the
passage of the Dodd–Frank bill. Giving testimony in congressional hearings became
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one of the main communication channels for consumer groups. In 2009, members of the
AFR coalition testified in several House and Senate committee and subcommittee hear-
ings, providing a coherent ‘causal story’ of policy failures in the run-up to the subprime
crisis (Kirsch & Mayer, 2013). Pro-reform groups thereby served an important function
for pro-reform advocates within the administration by disseminating information about
abusive lending practices and trying to create momentum for reform. Groups like the
CU or the CRL also collected testimonies of people wronged by abusive industry practices
on their webpages, asking people to share their ‘horror lending stories.’16 One Congres-
sional staffer reported that newly mobilized groups ‘helped in bringing attention to the
issues […], helped shape the debate and helped […] generate enthusiasm for what we
were trying to do.’17
The mobilization of nonfinancial groups had another important effect: Namely, that it
constrained the policy dominance of the financial industry lobby in the legislative process.
Due to changed political dynamics, industry groups had no power to block the legislative
proposal for a new consumer agency. Deprived of their veto capacity, and although nearly
the entire financial industry was opposed to a new regulator, the united front began crum-
bling. Barney Frank struck a deal with the Independent Community Bankers Association
(ICBA), exempting small banks from CFPB oversight and thereby neutralizing the smaller
community bankers, dividing the industry and weakening the overall industry’s attempt to
block passage of the CFPB or promote alternative proposals. From the industry groups’
point of view, the deal was a huge loss. Consumer advocates counted the semi-carve-out
for small banks under $10 billion as a partial victory, since the CFPB still had rule-writing
authority over small banks. At the final stage of passage, during the joint House−Senate
conference committee session, industry opposition proved unexpectedly weak, and no
further amendments were offered that would have weakened the CFPB (Kaiser, 2013;
Kirsch & Mayer, 2013; Woolley & Ziegler, 2011).18
Policy entrepreneurship
Also boosting the influence of diffuse interest groups was the fact that a skilled policy
entrepreneur served as a source of an innovative idea and subsequently invested time
and resources into the reform cause. Pro-change advocates found a strong and well-posi-
tioned policy entrepreneur in Harvard law professor and consumer advocate Elizabeth
Warren, who had published the initial idea for a consumer protection agency in 2007
and 2008. With the financial crisis, Warren’s policy solution suddenly started to match
politicians’ needs to respond to public pressures. Warren was not only an innovator,
but she was also politically savvy. With the relevant political connections, she was able
to shape political debate and build coalitions supporting her idea. Warren became a
highly visible political figure in November 2008 as Chair of the Troubled Asset Relief
Program Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) which was charged with reviewing the
current state of financial markets and the regulatory system. The first COP ‘Special
Report on Regulatory Reform,’ issued in January 2009, included Warren’s proposal of a
single federal regulator for consumer credit products.
Warren’s idea of a new consumer regulator found its way into the work of a brain-
storming group that President Obama had charged with the task to draft a first reform
bill in January 2009. One member of the group, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
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Michael Barr, personally knewWarren and was familiar with her academic work. Accord-
ing to one group member: ‘The president had either read her article or at least knew about
it or talked to her about it […]. So the idea of doing a consumer bureau was not an alien
one.’19 Reforms of the framework for consumer protection regulations, including a new
agency, were a central part of the group’s discussions throughout the early part of
2009.20 Based on their conclusions, the brainstorming group proposed an independent
CFPB and in June 2009, the Treasury included the proposal for a new agency in its
White Paper. Already in April 2009, Warren, according to her own account, had success-
fully convinced Barney Frank, the influential Chairman of the House Financial Services
Committee, that the consumer agency was a politically viable idea (Warren, 2014).
Throughout the reform debate, Warren served as a key expert, providing assessments
in regular meetings with Barney Frank.21
Insider–outsider coalitions
The Obama administration played a lead role in promoting the regulatory reform
favoured by consumer advocates. While it is rather obvious that interest groups do not
change policy in Washington without governmental allies, the more interesting question
is why the Obama administration and various members of Congress were willing to spend
their political capital on the quest for a CFPB. According to Mahoney and Baumgartner
(2015), government officials are more likely to become active policy advocates if they see
large resources mobilized by outside lobbying groups collectively, making policy success
more likely. In case of the CFPB, collective material resources mobilized by outside
groups in favour of regulatory reform clearly signalled to policy-makers that a strong
pro-reform lobby was in place. One Congressional staffer testified to the relevance of
this outside mobilization, saying that the ‘united front […] gave the consumer and civil
rights community […] the ability to expand the battlefield.’22 Personally enthusiastic
about reform, Obama highlighted the new consumer regulator in several speeches and
on popular television shows, clearly indicating presidential support of the mobilized
groups. In a speech given on 9 October, 2009, he stated his continuing support for
what was to become the CFPB, actively siding with consumer activists: ‘[…] we need a
Consumer Financial Protection Agency that will stand up not for big banks, not for finan-
cial firms, but for hardworking Americans. […] we can’t let special interests win this fight’
(Obama, 2009). Due to presidential support, the Democratic leaders of the committees
that handled financial reform—Representative Barney Frank and Senator Christopher
Dodd—both became active allies defending diffuse interests in the policy process.
During subsequent negotiations, consumer groups provided expertise and actively par-
ticipated in the drafting of reform legislation. Cooperation started early on in the reform
process with consumer groups becoming central interlocutors for the administration and
the Treasury Department to draft the new financial reform proposal in the spring of 2009.
Before the Treasury issued its White Paper on financial reform in June 2009, which
included the CFPB, consumer groups that would later become AFR had routinely met
with Treasury officials to give advice and express support for a strong consumer regulator.
Individual consumer groups (which at that point were not yet organized into a coalition)
enjoyed access to informal consultations and had effective connections with Treasury staff.
When the Treasury published its White Paper, meetings between the Assistant Secretary
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of the Treasury and the AFR coalition took place on a regular basis in order to draft leg-
islative language.23
Several examples illustrate the close working relationships among AFR and Congres-
sional staff in the key committees. When legislative action moved to the House Financial
Services Committee in the second half of 2009, consumer groups under the AFR umbrella
started to cooperate with Barney Frank and his staff, drafting legislation that would be
implemented from the blueprint.24 Remarking on the cooperation with Senator Dodd’s
staff, one AFR organizer described the interest groups’ close relation with governmental
allies in Congress this way: ‘We had three meetings with [Dodd] and his whole staff in
the course of the campaign, once at the start, once before the end and once in the
middle. We met with the staff […] all the time.’25 Congressional staffers interviewed for
this study reported that they relied heavily on consumer groups’ expertise for drafting
legislation. Each of the groups brought a specific area of expertise on consumer financial
issues to the table, thereby lending ‘incredible know-how to drafting [legislation].’Within
the broad coalition that AFR had brought together, one could find ‘experts on any given
issue […] with invaluable [knowledge] in technical areas.’26
Conclusions
What can this episode tell us about the politics of financial reform after the crisis? This
case study has shown that diffuse interests can be politically influential, even in a policy
field such as financial regulation that has been characterized as exclusively dominated
by organized industry interests. The findings presented here correspond to Trumbull’s
(2012) argument that diffuse interests are commonly represented in public policy and
that researchers seeking to understand the outcome of interest group conflicts must
look beyond the simple variable of material resourcefulness. Regulatory capture theories
clearly helped identify the causes for the incrementality of the overall reform law in
spite of the major shock the crisis had caused. My goal, however, has been to show that
this is only half of the story, and that diffuse interests did not go unrepresented in the
American financial regulatory overhaul.
Ultimately, the story of the struggle between consumer advocacy groups and financial
industry groups in the case of the CFPB suggests that weak interest groups benefit from
building coalitions with important elite allies outside and inside government that are
pushing for the same policy solution. Such coalitions have a substantial bearing on tra-
ditionally weak groups’ ability to shape regulatory policy. Thus, such groups can influence
policy decisions in a way that transcends any individual group’s material resourcefulness.
Through careful process tracing, I demonstrate that financial reforms are best explained
through a theoretical framework which takes into account the mobilization of diffuse
interest groups. The article tried to demonstrate that the story of post-crisis regulatory
reform in the US was one of diffuse interest coalitions, policy entrepreneurship, and gov-
ernmental allies, as much as—if not more than—a story of concentrated industry capture.
The engagement of the AFR coalition of nonfinancial groups in the reform debate
increased actor plurality and reduced industry dominance throughout the legislative
process. The cooperation with a well-positioned and savvy policy entrepreneur was a
key factor in the legislative fight for the CFPB. The most important drivers of regulator
change representing diffuse interests were governmental allies, including the President
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and committee chairmen, who pushed the proposal for a new consumer watchdog
through Congress. Notably, the committee chairmen responsible for financial reform
became active proponents of the consumer cause and cooperated closely in team-like
structures with the newly mobilized consumer advocacy coalition. The legislative
outcome was a winner-take-all result, with consumer groups winning the day and only
minor carve-outs for small community banks.
A comparison with other consumer protection legislation confirms the central role of
mobilized diffuse interest groups that cooperate with a policy entrepreneur in order to
bring governmental allies on the reform side that eventually pass legislation. The Credit
Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act (CARD Act) that passed in
May 2009 was the first piece of post-crisis financial reform legislation: ‘the most significant
federal consumer financial reform in decades’ (Wolff, 2012). Warren together with AFFIL
engaged in the credit card campaign and also testified at the first hearing in favour of the
CARD Act. Groups such as the NCLC had lobbied for years for better protection for con-
sumers, among others, from ‘fee-harvester’ credit cards. As soon as the financial crisis
brought overwhelming evidence of unfair and abusive practices of the credit card industry
to the fore, claims by consumer groups gained credibility. With many consumers heavily
indebted with credit card fees, it had become clear to policy-makers that credit card reform
had broad popular appeal. Advocacy groups tried to use the momentum and intensified
their lobbying for fair credit card practices by coming together as an informal coalition.
However, it was only when the President and his administration finally got behind the
legislation that the CARD Act was passed.
This article makes important contributions to the literature in IPE and the study of
interest group influence in policy-making. It stands out as one of the few attempts to
address theoretical questions about the conditions and processes through which diffuse
interests can gain influence on policy-making in the financial sector. By taking the ques-
tions of ‘why’ and ‘how’ seriously, and developing a theoretical model, the article contrib-
utes to opening up the black box of interest politics in domains that are typically
considered to be dominated by narrow industry interests and technical expertise of
small elite groups. It also makes a major empirical contribution to our understanding
of the hitherto underexplored world of mobilization, organizing, and preference formation
among consumers and citizens in the financial sector. The case study showed civil society
groups’ key role in providing (technical) expertise for the legislative process that breaks
with predominant accounts of technical expertise as a monopoly of the financial industry.
This analysis provides a novel perspective on the role of civil society actors in the domain
of finance and thereby calls into question previous, more summary assessments by authors
who found that civil society groups ‘play a fairly marginal role in the politics of commer-
cial finance, thereby largely surrendering the advocacy field to industry lobbies and estab-
lishment think tanks’ (Scholte, 2013, p. 130).
The analysis here also suggests that we need a much more nuanced picture of regulatory
capture than that portrayed by the literature on financial reform so far. My findings cor-
respond to the conclusions recently presented by Carpenter and Moss, who found that
‘regulatory capture is not an all-or-nothing affair,’ but rather ‘a matter of degree’ (Carpen-
ter & Moss, 2014, p. 452). The most important finding might be that capture of the policy-
making process through financial interests can be kept at bay. Conclusions drawn from the
case at hand do not allow for addressing larger questions of political and institutional
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change in ‘normal times.’ Rather, the theory developed here is limited in its application
to—albeit crucially important—cases in times of crisis.
Notes
1. Interview 10 with consumer advocate, Washington DC; 28 September 2013.
2. Updated versions of Dodd–Frank Progress Reports by Davis Polk are available at www.
davispolk.com/Dodd-Frank-Rulemaking-Progress-Report or the website of the US Securities
and Exchange Commission at www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml.
3. Interview 3a with consumer advocate, Washington, DC; 6 September 2013.
4. Interview with a banking lobbyist, Washington, DC; 16 September 2013.
5. I follow the suggestion by Beach and Pedersen that a causal mechanism is a system ‘that
transmit[s] causal forces from X to Y […], assuming that the context that allows them to
operate is present.’ (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 34).
6. Interest groups can be classified as diffuse or specific, depending on the underlying interests
of constituencies they represent. While diffuse interest groups represent a broad, collective
interest (such as consumers), specific interest groups represent a narrow self-interest (such
as industry groups) (Beyers, 2004, p. 216). Following Trumbull (2012, p. 10), consumer
groups are here understood as diffuse interests that pursue pragmatic policy outcomes in
their collective material interest (as opposed to concentrated interests).
7. Dodd–Frank, § 1021(a).
8. Interview with representative of consumer association, Washington, DC; 5 August 2011.
9. While regulatory capture theory was initially designed to explain the behaviour of regulatory
agencies, not legislative decisions, the concept has since been applied more broadly to
financial regulatory decision-making.
10. Interview with banking lobbyist, Washington, DC; 25 February 2014.
11. Interview with banking lobbyist, Washington, DC; 20 September 2013.
12. Statement of Sheila C. Bair, on Modernizing Bank Supervision and Regulation before the US
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 19 March 2009.
13. Interview with consumer advocate, Washington, DC; 12 September 2013.
14. Interview with consumer advocate, Washington, DC; 13 September 2013
15. Interview with consumer advocate, Washington, DC; 12 September 2013.
16. The website is available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/about-us/contact-us/share-
story.html.
17. Interview with Congressional staffer, Washington, DC; 7 March 2014.
18. Interview with consumer advocate, Washington, DC; 13 February 2014.
19. Interview with government official, Washington, DC; 10 March 2014.
20. Interview with government official, Washington, DC; 10 March 2014.
21. Interview with Congressional staffer, Washington, DC; 24 March 2014.
22. Interview with Congressional staffer, Washington, DC; 24 March 2014
23. Interview with Congressional staffer, Washington, DC; 7 March 2014 and interview 65b with
consumer advocate, Washington, DC; 13 February 2014.
24. Interview with consumer advocate, Washington, DC; 13 February 2014.
25. Interview with consumer advocate, Washington, DC; 28 September 2013.
26. Interview with Congressional staffer, Washington, DC; 17 March 2014.
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